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(Further notes.  Where we regard someone as superior to ourselves it’s not only 
envy which is affected.  See veneration at EIII52s `nxthe ret of p52.  Also p55)  
 
I.  Introduction 
One of the psychological habits that has always interested philosophers is our 
disposition to compare ourselves with other people.  We humans, it seems, are alert to 
the ways in which we are and are not alike, and our sensitivity to our similarities and 
differences grounds some of our most consequential passions. We envy people who 
have qualities that we ourselves would like to have, and are proud of qualities of our 
own that we think others would like to possess.  This is an age-old concern. 
Augustine, for instance, is alive to the affective implications of our perceptions of the 
similarities and differences between ourselves and others, and there is a hint of 
disapproval in his observation that, when a man cannot converse with those around 
him, he is liable to take more pleasure in his dog than in other people (Augustine 
1998, XIX.6). The lack of a common language blocks a sense of affinity among 
human beings that is the ground of some of our most powerful feelings and, at its 
strongest, is manifested in the kind of friendship that Montaigne describes as 
‘equitable and equable’ – equitable as to its sharing of burdens and benefits, and 
equable in its trust and affection (Montaigne, 1958, 139).  Early modern writers take 
up this strand of thought, but explain the comparative basis of our passions in an 
unprecedented range of ways. Malebranche, for example, perpetuates the well-
established view that our responses to the similarities and differences between natural 
things are an expression of divine benevolence (Malebranche, 1980, 351). Spinoza, by 
contrast, defends the theologically unorthodox claim that the operations of divine 
power are indifferent to human needs (E I App.). His question is how, in an uncaring 
environment, we can create and sustain patterns of similarity or agreement that will 
enable us to live joyfully.  
                                                 
1
 I’ve benefitted from discussions of earlier drafts of this paper at the University of 
York, the University of Montreal and Johns Hopkins University, and am especially 
grateful for the help I’ve received from Yitzhak Melamed, Hasana Sharpe and 
Quentin Skinner.   
 2 
In his Ethics Spinoza offers a philosophical answer. Only insofar as men live 
according to the guidance of reason, he contends, must they always agree in nature (E 
IVp35), and ‘only insofar as they agree in nature are they consistently useful to one 
another’ (E IVp31c). But according to the opening paragraphs of the Political 
Treatise, anyone who thinks that this is a sufficient basis for creating a harmonious 
way of life is dreaming of a golden age.  Humans are far from rational; rather, they 
are ‘so constituted that they pity those whose affairs are going badly and envy those 
who are prospering; they’re more inclined to vengeance than mercy; moreover, 
everyone wants others to live according to his mentality, so that they approve what he 
approves and reject what he rejects. Since everyone wants to be first, they fall into 
quarrels and try as hard as they can to crush each other.  Whoever turns out to be the 
winner prides himself more on harming the loser than on doing good for himself’ (TP 
1.5). If we are going to be useful to one another we therefore need to compensate for 
these antisocial impulses by learning how to bring it about that we agree in nature.  
The Theologico-Political Treatise looks to religion to provide a partial 
solution. Religious practices, it claims, can strengthen our capacity to agree with one 
another. However, by the time Spinoza came to write the Political Treatise, his faith 
in this strategy seems to have drained away. For modern citizens, he now argues, 
religion does not provide an effective antidote to conflict. ‘It is strong, of course, at 
the point of death, when illness has conquered the affects and the man lies wasting 
away. It is strong, also, in houses of worship, where men conduct no business. But it 
has no weight in the marketplace or the court, where we need it most’ (TP 1.5).  To 
create agreement in our natures we should rather follow the lead of people with 
practical experience of politics, who have already identified the types of civitas in 
which it is possible to live harmoniously and the means by which such harmony can 
be maintained (TP 1.3).  The resolution of the problem from which we set out is 
therefore fundamentally political.  Only by living in well-designed states can we 
achieve the kind of agreement that makes for a satisfying way of life. 
The constitutions outlined in the Political Treatise are intended to show how 
monarchies, aristocracies and democracies can generate levels of agreement within a 
community that are sufficiently high to remove the threat of internal resistance, and 
secure them so far as possible against external attack. His aristocracies, Spinoza 
boasts, are ‘everlasting’, and ‘can’t be destroyed by any inherent defect’ (TP X.9). 
But this buoyant claim raises a problem.  In all three types of constitution, many 
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groups of subjects are excluded from any part in political life.  In what sense, then, do 
they and the class of citizens whose privileges they are denied agree in nature? What 
sort of agreement serves to reconcile them to their political status and prevents them 
from resisting inequality?  
These questions loom particularly large in the closing pages of the unfinished 
Political Treatise, where Spinoza attributes the purported fact that women have never 
ruled over men to a difference in their natures. Women, he claims, differ in nature 
from men and are necessarily subject to them.  By implication, then, men and women 
cannot agree in nature and, as Spinoza duly insists, cannot enter into equal political 
relationships. ‘… Men and women can’t rule equally without great harm to the peace 
…’ (TP XI.3). As many eminent commentators have pointed out, several of Spinoza’s 
arguments for these conclusions fly in the face of his other commitments (Matheron, 
1977; Lloyd, 1994; Gatens and Lloyd, 1999; Gatens, 2009, Sharpe, 2011).  For 
example, he argues that women are not fit to rule because they do not have as much 
strength of mind (fortitudo animi) or ability (ingenium) as men, whilst also allowing 
that men, who are fit to rule, often lack these very qualities. The same air of 
contradiction surrounds the two statements I have singled out – that men and women 
differ in nature and that women are necessarily subject to men – which appear to 
conflict with the Political Treatise’s assertion that ‘everyone shares a common nature’ 
(TP VII.27).  Incoherences such as these, together with the tone and structure of the 
passage, suggest that something psychologically complicated is going on, and that 
Spinoza is doing more than offering a philosophical argument.  Nevertheless, I think 
it is possible to read his claim about men’s and women’s natures in a way that is 
compatible with his broader conception of the natures of individual things, and in the 
final section of this chapter I shall suggest how this can be done.  
My main interest in this interpretative exercise is not, however, to show that it 
offers a way to rescue Spinoza’s attack on women rulers, an argument that seems to 
me irretrievably flawed.  Rather, I shall suggest, it enables us to address Spinoza’s 
treatment of political inequality more broadly by alerting us to the fact that he regards 
many groups as unfitted for citizenship, thus raising the question of whether their 
members also differ in nature from the members of ruling elites. Is the case of men 
and women unique, as it is easy to assume, or are differences in nature between social 
groups relatively commonplace? If so, how do these differences bear on the political 
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status of the groups concerned? For example, can the enduring political exclusion of a 
group always be attributed to the nature of its members?   
Since successful societies are in Spinoza’s view built on agreement, these 
questions take us back to the underlying issue of what it is for the members of a 
community to agree with one another.  Does agreement obtain between people who 
differ in nature? And if so, how? In the next section of this chapter I shall therefore 
consider what kind of agreement Spinoza is concerned with. In the third I shall ask 
how far this sort of agreement is compatible with political inequality. And in the 
fourth I shall draw on these discussions to show how, in his Political Treatise, 
Spinoza is able consistently to claim that men and women differ in nature.  
Securing co-operation among individuals who have divergent and often 
incompatible desires and aspirations is clearly a complicated task, and states have 
various tools for dealing with it.  They can, for example, scare people into compliance 
by threatening to punish those who disobey the law.  The model states of the Political 
Treatise all rely on this technique, and Spinoza regards it as an essential aspect of 
government (TP IV.4).  But he acknowledges the disadvantages of terrorising 
populations, and also advocates a gentler approach (TP V.4). As far as possible, states 
should create circumstances in which subjects view obedience as beneficial, and want 
to do what the law demands of them; but in order to manage this, legislators need to 
take account of human nature. In particular, they must devise laws sensitive to the 
psychic dispositions that bind us together and drive us apart, and use these to create 
ways of life in which co-operation is sustained (TP VII.2). If they succeed in doing so, 
they will create circumstances in which people are, as Spinoza puts it, like one 
another, and agree with one another.  However, as I shall show, these forms of 
likeness and difference, agreement and disagreement, are primarily manifested in our 
affective powers. To see how agreement can be encouraged by political means, we 
therefore need to begin by examining the various affective dispositions on which 
agreement rests, and in which it is manifested.  
 
II.  Commonality and Agreement 
To know whether we are like one another we first have to recognise that we are 
distinct individuals, and according to Spinoza we come to know ourselves through the 
passive affects that we experience when external things affect us (E IIp23). In some 
cases these affects give us a fantastical sense of the difference between ourselves and 
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other things, as when a baby fails to distinguish itself from its mother, or a tortured 
Christian is convinced that she is inhabited by the devil. But even when we have a 
comparatively realistic grasp of our own boundary, the affects that constitute it remain 
to some extent confused. For example, even when I know that I am distinct from the 
frightening dog biting at my heels, my fear of the dog is liable to reflect a partial 
misunderstanding of what it is about me that enables the dog to affect me as it does. 
Lacking this self-knowledge, I may, for instance, overrate its aggressiveness and 
underrate my own timidity (EIIIp25).   
Misunderstandings of this kind are, in Spinoza’s view, an endemic 
manifestation of the conatus that constitutes our individual essence or nature.  As 
human beings, we strive to persevere in our being (E IIIp6).  We try to increase and 
stabilise our capacity to deal resiliently with the external things we encounter, and the 
patterns of our success and failure are manifested in our affects.  When our striving is 
successful, we experience joyful affects such as hope, gladness or self-esteem, and 
when we fail we experience forms of sadness (E IIIp11). Moreover, because 
joyfulness is inherently pleasurable, we find it desirable.  Each of us strives to satisfy 
our desires by bringing about pleasurable states of affairs and avoiding those that we 
find saddening. But the striving itself can also lead us to misconstrue the way we are 
affected by external things, as when I blame the dog for being frightening rather than 
acknowledging my own lack of courage.  We often protect our joyfulness by 
misinterpreting what we and the external world are like, and by doing so block the 
path to fuller understanding.  
The process by which we come to distinguish ourselves from other things is 
therefore an affective one.  Rather than starting out with an idea of ourselves and 
encountering aspects of the external world, we derive this idea from the way things 
affect us, so that my idea of myself is an idea of the many ways in which I have been 
affected.  Furthermore, we experience other things affectively.  Rather than 
encountering patches of colour or tables and chairs, we encounter objects of desire or 
aversion and distinguish them from one another on this basis. Someone who finds, for 
example, that artichokes are delicious and beetroot is disgusting learns to differentiate 
between the two vegetables, but also learns something about themselves, namely how 
each vegetable affects them.   
Part III of the Ethics contains an elaborate classification of the ways in which 
we experience external things. But as Spinoza warns, no schema can capture all our 
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affects.  This is partly because they vary with their objects, as when a man’s love for 
his wife differs from his love for his children, parents or friends (E IIIp56s), and 
partly because our affects reflect our individual constitutions and histories. Cities, for 
example, may excite me but depress you, and as Spinoza remarks, human lust differs 
from equine lust (E IIIp57s).  Nevertheless, since the ways that human individuals 
strive to persevere in their being or live joyfully are on the whole more similar than 
the respective strivings of humans and horses, we can generalise about the 
characteristic ways in which we humans exercise our conatus, and about our roughly 
similar responses to particular types of things. While each of us has their own desires 
and strives to realise them, we have many pleasures, desires and sadnesses in 
common, and these inform our sense of what we are. Our conception of ourselves as 
members of the human species is therefore rooted in a shared style of affective 
responsiveness to external things, which not only grounds our sense that we are like 
one another, but also informs the way we compare ourselves.  “When we compare one 
person with another’, Spinoza explains, ‘we distinguish them only by a difference of 
affects’, as for example when we call some intrepid and others timid (E IIIp51).  For 
Spinoza, then, this is the significant sense in which we are like one another, and it is 
this affective commonality that makes us mutually useful. The fact that other people 
respond to external things with a repertoire of affects resembling our own creates a 
crucial form of similarity between us, and our recognition that we are alike in this 
respect in turn shapes our efforts to live joyfully. Consciously and unconsciously, it 
inclines us to strive to increase our own joyfulness by imitating other people’s affects.   
According to Spinoza, this overarching disposition to imitate the affects of 
others is manifested in a range of specific responses.  For example,  ‘from the mere 
fact that we imagine someone to enjoy something, we shall love that thing and desire 
to enjoy it’ (E IIIp32).  When you recognise that, because another person is somewhat 
like you, the things that give them pleasure are likely to give you pleasure as well, you 
will want what they want.  Or to take another case, ‘we pity a thing … provided that 
we judge it to be like us’ (E IIIp22s).  If you come across a melancholy stranger and 
recognise that she is suffering what you would suffer if you were melancholy, her 
sadness will arouse an answering sadness or pity in you.  Or again, ‘we favour him 
who has benefited someone like us’ (E 3p22s).  When we observe someone else 
feeling grateful to a third person who has benefited them, and recognise that we 
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would feel gratitude in comparable circumstances, we too feel love or favour for the 
giver (E III, Definition of the Affects XIX). 
These examples illustrate a one-sided process in which individuals who 
recognise that they share a range of affective dispositions independently imitate the 
others’ affects. However, while Spinoza holds that this style of response is 
characteristic of human beings, he implies that there is something immature about it.  
It is, as it were, a residue of the way that small children laugh just because others 
laugh and cry merely because others cry, without knowing why they do so (E 
IIIp32s).  Among adults, the one-sided imitation of the affects is complemented by 
more complex patterns of mutual accommodation, in which individuals strive for 
collective empowerment and satisfaction.  Some of these patterns surround our desire 
for esteem. Suppose, for example, I hanker for your esteem. I know that you approve 
of people who give money to charity and, by imagining the satisfaction that their 
actions give you, I come to want what you want.  I too admire people who give to 
charity. Suppose also that, acting on this affect, I start to give money to charity 
myself. By doing so I give you the double pleasure of esteeming me and seeing your 
affect more widely shared; but I also increase my own self-esteem, both because my 
own action gives me satisfaction and because I know it pleases you. Each of us 
therefore increases the pleasure of the other, and underlying our exchange is our 
mutual recognition of our affective commonality. Each of us wants the esteem of the 
other, and each of us accommodates our affects to those of the other in order to satisfy 
our own desire.   
These relationships are particular instances of a more encompassing form of 
imitative exchange that is also based on our recognition of affective similarity. ‘When 
we love a thing that is like ourselves’, Spinoza tells us, ‘we strive as far as we can to 
bring it about that it loves us in return’ (E 3p33).  To love someone, according to this 
account, is to try to make oneself lovable to the beloved by imitating their affects (for 
instance by wanting what they want, favouring those who benefit them and fostering 
their self-esteem), and to be loved is to be the recipient of this pattern of feeling. 
Friends or lovers strive to co-ordinate their affects so that each makes the other more 
joyful. To some extent, their relationships are grounded on affective similarity in the 
straightforward sense that people who love one another usually have some traits in 
common; they may, for example, share an interest in history, a sense of humour, or a 
preference for living tidily. But the commonality with which Spinoza is concerned is a 
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mutual capacity to enhance the joy of others by accommodating and responding to 
their affects, symbolised by images of lovers united in perfect harmony, and by 
communities bound together in unalloyed concord (E III, Definition of the Affects 
VI).  This is what it is for individuals to become like one another, and the more stably 
harmonious their relationships become the more they agree with one another. 
Likeness or agreement between people is therefore not an end state.  Rather, it is a 
measure of their on-going power to maintain a co-operative and joyful form of life.   
 To illustrate agreement in its fullest form, Spinoza imagines a group of people 
who ‘so agree in all things that they compose, as it were, one mind and one body … 
and seek for themselves the common advantage of all’ (E IVp18s). Each wants for the 
others what they want for themselves and unfailingly treats the rest with justice and 
kindness. However, as he also insists, such a level of harmony is in practice beyond 
us. Agreement is always limited, because the same patterns of imitation that enable us 
to co-operate also work, in two distinct ways, to undermine co-operation and generate 
discord (E IIIp32). As we have seen, the recognition that we are affectively like one 
another prompts us to imitate others people’s desires; but while this can increase our 
joyfulness it can also generate envy (Girard, 2004). Some of our desires are for things 
that cannot be shared, and when two people want something that only one of them can 
enjoy, each will envy the other (E IIIp32). Moreover, because envy of an individual 
tends to mutate into envy of the group to which they belong, its poisonous effects are 
liable to spread throughout a community.  In addition - and here the second 
destructive form of imitation comes into play - our efforts to live joyfully by 
cultivating relationships of love and esteem are often damaged by a form of ambition.  
Instead of striving for mutual accommodation with others, we strive to create 
relationships that benefit us more than them, by getting them to share our desires and 
do what we want (E III p31s). Rather than accommodating ourselves to the world, we 
try to form it in our own image. 
Each of these patterns of imitation rests on an inadequate understanding of the 
satisfactions that agreement brings and the processes through which it can be 
cultivated. Envy arises among people who strive to empower themselves by satisfying 
specific desires, such as a desire to be exclusively loved, and are unable to adapt in 
the light of others’ aspirations. This way of exercising one’s conatus generates 
conflict because it fails to take account of the commonality of our imitative 
dispositions; like us, others want to be exclusively loved, and like us, they resist those 
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who threaten the realisation of their desires. The same type of misunderstanding 
afflicts people whose ambition prompts them to try to induce others to imitate their 
affects. They manifest an inability to combine forces with other people in a mutually 
empowering fashion, and thus an inability to cultivate agreement. However, since 
these antisocial affective dispositions are aspects of human nature and part of what we 
have in common, we cannot simply wish them away. To create enough agreement to 
live together harmoniously we must become more alike by enlarging our affective 
capacity to co-operate.  Moreover, as the Political Treatise reminds us, it is no good 
leaving this task to individuals. Only by living in the state can we create patterns of 
affect that are resilient enough to offset our destructive imitative impulses (TP VII.2).  
 
III.  Creating Agreement 
To live in the state is essentially to live under laws made and enforced by a sovereign. 
Rather than encountering other individuals one by one and striving in each case to 
incorporate them into a joyful way of life, citizens and subjects confront a more 
impersonal system of legal rules, designed to inhibit affective disagreement. The 
precise content of such rules will vary from one state to another, but Spinoza is 
confident that monarchical, aristocratic and democratic constitutions can all be 
organised in such a way that rulers and ruled are able to live together harmoniously 
and securely (TP VI.3, VII.2).  
Embedded in his defence of this view, we find a number of strategies for 
sustaining the internal cohesion of states by limiting the development of envy between 
citizens. First and most obviously, a state can remove some causes of envy by 
endowing citizens with equal rights that are immune to the threat of competition. As 
long as I have the same rights as you, and am not in danger of losing them, I have no 
reason to envy you. This strategy for blocking one of the most destructive aspects of 
affective imitation is at work in Spinoza’s monarchical and aristocratic constitutions. 
In his model monarchy, for instance, citizens are divided into familiae or clans, 
subject to a single set of laws.  Each clan contributes an equal number of members to 
a Grand Council that proposes legislation to the king, and because membership of the 
Council rapidly rotates, many clan-members have the opportunity to stand for office. 
By preventing political power from falling into the hands of a faction, and by enabling 
many citizens to play a part in government, these arrangements prevent the growth of 
envy between clans, and also between those who do and do not hold office. The same 
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process is at work in Spinoza’s absolute aristocracy, where laws are enacted by a 
large council of senators. Complex rules ensure that all members of the patrician class 
have ‘an equally great hope of achieving senatorial rank’ (TP VIII.30).  
As well as making access to political power comparatively open, the 
monarchical constitution outlined in the Political Treatise institutes another form of 
equality; ownership of land is forbidden, and the entire territory belongs to the state, 
which rents land and dwellings to individuals on an annual basis (TP VI.12).  This 
measure, which surely owes something to the law of the ancient Hebrew Republic 
(TTP, XVII. 84), is designed to prevent people envying one another’s land holdings, 
although it is clearly not enough to prevent them from envying property of other 
kinds. Merchants, for example, may still covet one another’s goods.  Nevertheless, 
Spinoza argues, it is particularly important to prevent competition for land, because 
the state’s territory symbolises the common life of the citizenry and is, as it were, the 
material manifestation of the agreement that the state is designed to maintain. This 
arena of envious competition therefore needs to be controlled with particular care. 
Alongside equal rights, Spinoza uses two further strategies to limit envy, the 
first of which reduces the desirability of privilege. In monarchy, for instance, where 
only the members of the royal family possess noble status, the king’s male relatives 
are subject to restrictive laws; they are expected to serve the state, they are forbidden 
to marry, and their sons are classed as illegitimate.  In these circumstances, noble 
status is more likely to be regarded as a burden than a benefit worth coveting. A 
second strategy uses political means to direct envy along constructive paths. Since, in 
Spinoza’s view, we are so desirous of gloria or esteem that we can hardly bear 
disgrace, rulers can shape our patterns of desire by esteeming us for actions that 
enhance commonality (E3p29s, E4p52s).  In aristocracy, for example, the esteem in 
which counsellors are held will encourage citizens to stand for office (TPVII.6).  
Drawing on traditional methods such as these, Spinoza indicates how states 
can create environments in which the envy that flows from the imitation of the affects 
is diminished.  However, a problem remains. The constitutions described in the 
Political Treatise also confront the tougher challenge of building agreement between 
groups who have rights of citizenship and groups who do not. Like everyone else, the 
latter groups will tend to imitate the affects of others, and will be prone to envy those 
whose privileges they would like to possess. Moreover, if everyone would rather rule 
than be ruled, as Spinoza claims, envy is liable to fix on those who possess civic 
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rights (TP VII.5).  Non-citizens will envy citizens, and this will in turn undermine the 
agreement on which the security of the state rests.  
This problem arises in all Spinoza’s model constitutions. In monarchy, 
citizenship is denied to mutes, the insane, those who follow servile occupations, and 
notoriously wicked individuals (TP VI.11).  In aristocracy, the members of a large 
class of plebeians (which includes men under fifty (TP VII.4), people born outside the 
state, newly-conquered peoples, criminals, men with foreign wives, and those 
engaged in servile occupations such as wine-sellers and pub-owners, (TP VIII.14)) are 
debarred from serving as counsellors and from voting, and are regarded as peregrini 
or foreigners (TP VIII.9, 10). And in democracy the range of exclusions grows to 
encompass women and servants, children and pupils, and those who have been 
disgraced, for example by committing a crime (TP XI.3). How, then, are these various 
excluded classes to be prevented from envying the privileges of citizenship and trying 
to acquire them for themselves?  
In the Political Treatise Spinoza emphatically rejects the view that ordinary 
subjects are by nature less virtuous than ruling elites. On the contrary, he claims, there 
are no systematic differences between social groups. ‘Everyone has the same nature.  
Everyone is proud when he’s master; everyone terrorises when he’s not cowed by 
fear; and everywhere it’s common for enemies and servile flatterers to bend the truth’ 
(TP VII.27). To put the point in more general terms, we all strive to persevere in our 
being in broadly the same way and, as we have seen, this gives us an affective 
commonality that distinguishes human beings from things of other kinds. Lions, for 
example, differ from us in nature. The manner in which they strive to maintain 
themselves differs from ours, and insofar as we recognise this, we do not try to 
increase our own joyfulness by imitating their desires or entering into their joys and 
sorrows (E IVp37s). The differences in nature between members of their species and 
members of our own inhibit affective imitation between us, and this is why, as 
Spinoza remarks, we do not envy lions their strength (E IIIp55s; E III p57s)).  
Moreover, while humans as a group resemble each other more than they resemble 
lions, there are also differences in nature between one human being and another.  We 
do not all strive to persevere in our being in exactly the same way. Our overarching 
orientation to other human beings is also shaped by fine-grained estimations of 
likeness and difference, and these, too, are expressed in our imitative affects; 
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‘everyone is so constituted by nature that he wants to be reckoned as belonging to his 
own kind, and distinguished from the rest by his origin’ (TP VII.18).   
Spinoza draws on this view to argue that, when we regard another person as so 
different from ourselves as to possess a different nature, we do not envy them. ‘A man 
neither strives to do, nor desires, anything unless it follows from his given nature.  So 
no man desires that there be predicated of him any power of acting or (what is the 
same) virtue, which is peculiar to another’s nature and alien to his own.  Hence his 
desire is restrained and … he cannot envy him’ (E IIIp55c).  The gulf between the 
ways in which people persevere in their being is manifested in their affects, and the 
divergence between two people’s desires, joys and sorrows can make it difficult or 
impossible for either of them to want what the other wants, and thus to envy them.  
The affective commonality among human beings is therefore thinned or thickened by 
variations in our individual natures, and when it is sufficiently thinned, the difference 
between two human natures becomes comparable to that between humans and lions.  
Just as we do not envy lions their strength, so we do not envy humans whose desires 
and virtues are quite different from our own. But while the gap between humans and 
lions is so great that there is no realistic possibility of bridging it, differences in nature 
between one human and another may sometimes change. A philosopher who steadily 
enlarges her understanding may become more like a colleague whom she had initially 
regarded as incomparably superior, and as they become more alike in nature they will 
imitate one another’s affects in different ways. Envy may enter the picture, but so may 
friendship. To some extent, then, the similarities and differences between our 
individual natures come and go as we lose or acquire qualities that bring us into 
agreement.  
These instabilities in our relationships pose a political challenge. Successful 
states must be able to withstand their fluctuations by creating a peaceful way of life 
that can endure, even as our patterns of affect alter.  But the malleability of our 
individual natures also makes it possible for states to counteract envy by encouraging 
the idea that the members of one group are in some respect significantly different in 
nature from the members of another, or by simply taking advantage of the fact that 
such an idea is already prevalent.  Citizens, Spinoza reminds us, are not born but 
made (TP V.2).  The constitutions set out in the Political Treatise are among other 
things designed to create groups of subjects whose members possess different powers: 
on the one hand, they train a class of citizen patricians by providing them with the 
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kind of experience and acculturation that fits them for government; on the other hand, 
by denying this training to plebeians, they bring it about that plebeians are in some 
respects less well equipped to rule than their patrician counterparts.  While the 
members of the two groups share powers and dispositions that constitute them as 
humans, some of the more specific ways in which they strive to persevere in their 
being are shaped by their political status, so that members of one group tend to 
become somewhat different in nature from members of the other.  Forming their 
desires in the light of their political circumstances, plebeians may as a general rule 
come to want somewhat different things from patricians, and this may weaken their 
disposition to envy the privileges of citizenship. Insofar as this process is effective, it 
will blunt non-citizens’ sense of entitlement to inclusion and reconcile them to their 
relative lack of political power.   
One of the criteria Spinoza uses to justify exclusion from citizenship derives 
from the traditional republican view that one cannot be a citizen if one does not live 
under one’s own power, but is instead subject to the arbitrary power of someone else 
(TP X.3). When women are subject to their husbands, servants to their masters or 
mistresses, and children to their parents, they are not in a position to act as they wish; 
and even when no one actually coerces them they remain vulnerable to coercion, so 
that a servant whose master is benign, for example, is formally speaking no less 
vulnerable than one whose mistress punishes her every move. Among theorists of 
republicanism, simply being dependent in this sense is regarded as enough to unfit 
one for citizenship. Citizens, it is assumed, must possess a sufficient degree of 
financial and social independence to act on their own judgment without fear or favour, 
and people who are beholden to others for their livelihoods or protection lack this 
power. They are easily bought or otherwise corrupted, and if active in government are 
liable to foster faction and injustice. In addition, so some republicans argue, members 
of dependent groups tend to adjust their desires and expectations to their 
circumstances.  In areas where they do not have the opportunity to act on their own 
judgment, they lose the confidence and courage to do so and become timid and 
servile. Moreover, by internalising this way of striving to persevere in their being, 
they become comparatively ill-suited for citizenship.  The social and legal divide 
between independent and dependent individuals therefore serves to create a difference 
in nature between the two groups (a somewhat systematic difference in the way the 
members of each group strive to persevere in their being), and brings it about that one 
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group is less well-endowed than the other with the qualities that qualify one for 
citizenship.   
Spinoza agrees that, when these consequences of dependence are internalised, 
freedom is destroyed.  The subjects of the Ottoman Emperor, for example, ‘will fight 
for slavery as they would for their survival’ (TTP Preface 10; TP V.4). Their 
dependence on their rulers so shapes their affects that they prefer slavery to freedom, 
and this desire will in turn be reflected in their patterns of affective imitation.  They 
will tend, for example, to establish friendships with individuals who share their 
outlook, and will reinforce their own preference for servitude by wanting what these 
people want. In standard republican style, Spinoza condemns such slavery as 
antithetical to the freedom and understanding that states are meant to nurture 
(TP10.5), but this very form of disempowerment appears to afflict at least some of the 
groups who are excluded from citizenship in his model constitutions.  We should 
expect, for example, that wives who are dependent on their husbands, or servants who 
are dependent on their masters, may come to see themselves as inferior in nature, at 
least insofar as they lack some of the qualities prized in citizens. In addition, we 
should expect this difference to be manifested in their affects. For example, women 
and servants who view themselves as ill-equipped for political life may not envy the 
privileges of citizens, and feel relatively little hunger for political inclusion.  
 Although unequal relationships of this kind fall far short of the ideal of 
agreement described in the Ethics, the Political Treatise does not resist the 
implication that states can uphold agreement among politically unequal classes by 
creating and exploiting the way their members imitate one another’s affects. 
Furthermore, the fact that Spinoza excludes so many groups from citizenship, whilst 
claiming that his constitutions are so ingeniously structured as to be everlasting, 
suggests that he has considerable faith in this strategy.  Socially sustained differences 
in nature between one group and another can play a significant part in the process of 
reconciling people to political exclusion and inhibiting their desire to resist it.  
 
IV   The Case of Women 
It remains to be seen whether the argument we have traced can help us to make sense 
of Spinoza’s contention that men and women differ in nature in a way that makes 
women less fit than men to rule, or cast light on his claim that women are necessarily 
subject to men. A first point worth noting is that, although he does not deny that states 
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can create and sustain variations in nature between one group and another, Spinoza 
does impose limits on the ways in which these variations are used. For example, states 
sometimes try to make their subjects servile by deceiving them into believing that 
they are only fitted to obey, as for example when counsellors set out to persuade a 
populace that their ruler is divine. However, encouraging delusion and superstition in 
this fashion is, Spinoza claims, so dangerous to the state that wise constitution-
builders will avoid it (TTP Preface). The differences in nature that statesmen rely on 
to institutionalise political inequality must be, as far as these actors can tell, existing 
features of the communities in question, and sufficiently enduring to underwrite stable 
political arrangements.  
It is also important to remember that, however robust a particular difference in 
nature between two groups may seem, it can never be impervious to change.  Since, as 
Spinoza reminds us, human nature is everywhere the same, the divergent ways in 
which specific groups persevere in their being do not derive from unalterable 
differences between them.  Rather, they are to be explained by the fact that the 
members of a given group have been affected in similar ways, and as a result have 
developed similar patterns of affective response. It remains true, however, that traits 
created in this fashion may strike deep roots. For example, nothing in the antecedent 
nature of a community makes it better suited to thrive in an aristocracy than in a 
monarchy; but once its members have lived in an aristocratic society for some time, 
Spinoza warns, they will find it difficult to adapt to another political system (TTP 
XVIII.28).  Sub-groups will have acquired the variations in nature that aristocracy 
requires, together with the affective dispositions that accompany them.  They will 
have become people of particular kinds, so that although the possibility of 
constitutional change is not ruled out, it will be difficult to achieve. By contrast, other 
differences between the affective inclinations of groups may be comparatively 
ephemeral.  Market forces, for example, may quickly change a group’s tastes and 
aspirations, thus altering the manner in which its members strive to persevere in their 
being, and enhancing or undermining its agreement with the groups around it. The 
variations in nature that distinguish the members of one group from those of another 
therefore range along a continuum.  At one end are differences that are relatively 
deeply ingrained and hard to change.  At the other end are differences that are easily 
malleable.   
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Philosophy, as Spinoza envisages it, can tell us that such a continuum exists, 
and provide a general account of its effects.  It allows us to infer, for instance, that 
differences in our natures are reflected in the patterns of envy we feel for other 
people. But it cannot tell us what particular forms of envy have persistently shaped 
the natures of specific political groups, or how far they have undermined agreement 
between them. To formulate the detailed provisions of his constitutions, Spinoza 
therefore supplements philosophical generalisations with historical ones, turning for 
inspiration to political authorities whose claims are based on experience.  ‘The men 
who’ve discussed and established the common laws and public affairs were very acute 
(whether cunning or shrewd).  So it’s hardly credible that we can conceive of 
anything potentially useful for society as a whole which circumstances or chance 
haven’t suggested, and which men – keenly attentive to their common affairs and 
looking after their own security – haven’t seen’ (TP I.3). History not only provides the 
nuts and bolts that enable a philosopher to conceive model states – the empirically- 
tested strategies that make it possible to construct agreement.  It also provides 
evidence about the circumstances in which these strategies have been effective. For 
example, as we have seen, Spinoza offers a philosophical argument for the view that, 
when groups perceive one another as differing somewhat in nature, their mutual envy 
is diminished. But he needs the historical record to tell him how this disposition can 
be effectively put to work and used to uphold agreement. When, for example, the 
historical evidence indicates that states have habitually excluded servants from 
citizenship on the grounds that they are dependent on their masters, and have done so 
without significantly undermining agreement, Spinoza will regard himself as justified 
in advocating the same policy. When it indicates that monarchical election tends to 
generate conflict, he will steer clear of it.  
The strength of Spinoza’s commitment to this approach is perhaps most 
evident in his discussion of the political status of women, where the conclusion that 
women are not fit to rule is defended on historical grounds. ‘Whenever we find men 
and women living together’, he claims, ‘they have never ruled together.  What we see 
is that the men rule and the women are ruled, and that in this way both sexes live in 
harmony.  …  If women were by nature equal to men, both in strength of character 
(fortitudo animi) and in native intelligence (ingenium) – in which the greatest power 
and consequently human right, consists – surely among so many and such diverse 
nations we should find some where each sex ruled equally, and others where men 
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were ruled by women…. But since this has not happened anywhere, we can say that 
women do not, by nature, have a right equal to men’s, but that they necessarily submit 
to men’ (TP XI.4). Philosophy can of course help us to interpret the first part of this 
claim, that men and women differ in nature and therefore do not have an equal right 
or power. If  differently-placed groups are likely to develop somewhat different 
natures, it is not unreasonable to assume that, in societies where women habitually 
persevere in their being by submitting to men, and tend to  internalise the 
requirements of their position, there will be a sense in which men and women differ in 
nature.  Moreover, because the manner in which men and women imitate one 
another’s affects will be somewhat coloured by these differences, it is possible that 
women will not envy men’s political privileges enough to fight for them.  
To make space for the second part of Spinoza’s claim - that women 
necessarily submit to men – we need to return to the continuum between deeply-
etched and more superficial differences in nature. Since even the most deeply-etched 
differences between one group and another are not entirely impervious to change, 
differences in nature between men and women are not necessary in the sense that the 
power relations between the two groups could under no circumstances be other than 
as they are.  On the contrary, as circumstances change we should expect the affective 
relationships between men and women to alter, and should expect this alteration to put 
pressure on the gendered division of power.  Perhaps, then, the language of necessity 
to which Spinoza resorts is designed to remind us of his view that, since every event 
follows necessarily from its causes, no case in which a woman has submitted to a man 
could have been otherwise.  The supposed fact that there has never been a case where 
women ruled over men suggests that, while differences in nature between men and 
women are not strictly speaking beyond change, they are nevertheless about as deeply 
entrenched as such a difference can be. So much so, that for political purposes we 
should regard them as necessary. 
To accept these readings is to accept that, in this passage and arguably 
throughout much of the Political Treatise, Spinoza gives history priority over 
philosophy.  While philosophy acknowledges that our natures can undergo radical 
change as we learn to persevere more effectively in our being, the Treatise argues that 
the best way to build strong political constitutions is to pay attention to the 
generalisations that have emerged from centuries of political experiment.  Instead of 
conceiving philosophically attractive but politically distant ways of life and setting 
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out to realise them, we should be guided by experience and stick to what it 
recommends.  Where history can show us how to cultivate agreement by limiting 
envy, we should take advantage of its advice; and where it suggests that, in order to 
control envy, we need to cultivate differences in nature between one group and 
another, we should not shrink from doing so.  As we have seen, history teaches us that 
people can live together without conflict in monarchies, aristocracies and 
democracies, and that, on the whole, communities are wise to stick with the 
constitutions they have inherited.  At the same time, it tells us that, in stable 
constitutions of all these types, groups of subjects have been denied the political rights 
of citizenship. Since it would be rash to fly in the face of this traditional wisdom, one 
of a constitution-maker’s tasks is to work out which groups should be excluded and 
why. In some cases the answer will depend on aspects of the particular situation in 
hand; but in other cases history itself makes the decision by providing overwhelming 
evidence for inclusion or exclusion. If, as Spinoza claims, there has never been a state 
in which women rule over men, history counsels against giving women this right.  
The safe course is to exclude them, while reconciling them as effectively as possible 
to their unequal political status. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
By focusing on Spinoza’s analysis of the kind of agreement that enables people to live 
harmoniously, and tracing its implications for the model states he outlines in the 
Political Treatise, we have confronted an uncomfortable issue. In all Spinoza’s 
constitutions, many groups are excluded from political participation, and their 
acceptance of their inferior status is largely taken for granted. But since Spinoza holds 
that we are by nature envious of other people’s benefits and are liable to compete for 
them, he needs to explain how such inequality can be sustained.  By appealing to 
differences in nature between individuals, and to the effects that these differences 
have on our patterns of envy, he outlines a strategy for upholding co-operation in the 
face of political inequality.  Somewhat like modern theorists of relative deprivation, 
he takes it that our strongest affects are reserved for those whom we regard as similar 
in nature to ourselves, and that as this sense of similarity diminishes, so our affective 
engagement weakens (Runciman, 1966).  We do not envy people who are morally, 
geographically or socially distant from us as much as we envy those with whom we 
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identify.  Furthermore, states can take advantage of this disposition to deny some of 
their subjects the privileges of citizenship.  
Because the differences on which this strategy trades are not fixed, there is 
always the hope (or fear) that they will change, and that, in order to maintain a viable 
level of agreement among the members of a community, states will become more 
egalitarian.  But in the Political Treatise Spinoza sets such hopes aside.  Successful 
states, as he portrays them, cultivate patterns of affect that reconcile much of the 
population to political subordination and thus to a comparatively limited form of 
freedom.  
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